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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

OF

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART I.

QQ. CIII.—CXIX.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE

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TREATISE ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

FIRST PART.

TREATISE ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

QUESTION CIII.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL.

(In Eight Articles.)

HAVING considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the world is governed by someone? (2) What is the end of this government? (3) Whether the world is governed by one? (4) Of the effects of this government? (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government? (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God? (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything? (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ANYONE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed,

which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.

Obj. 2. Further, those things are governed which are moved towards some object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

Obj. 3. Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. xiv. 3): *But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence.* And Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iii.): *Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal.*

I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (*De Nat. Deorum* ii.), quoting Aristotle.* Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q. XLIV., A. 4; Q. LXV., A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as *it belongs to the best to produce the best,* it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment

* Cleanthes.

of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

Reply Obj. 2. In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q. CIV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

Second Article.

WHETHER THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD IS SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE WORLD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health which is something good in him. Therefore the end of the government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 1): *Some ends are an operation; some are a work—i.e.,* produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.

Obj. 3. Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the *tranquillity of order*, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. xvi. 4): *The Lord hath made all things for Himself.* But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.

I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q. XLIV., AA. 1, 2), that we must conclude that

the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.

Reply Obj. 1. We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed.

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired, or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.

Reply Obj. 3. A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in *Metaph.* xii. (Did. xi. 10).

Third Article.

WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ONE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 2. Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskilfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 3. Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it *is better that two should be together than one* (Eccles. iv. 9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. viii. 6): *To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord:* and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. XIII., A. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.

I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boëthius proves (*De Consol.* iii. 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire

unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from some defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (*Metaph.* xii., Did. xi. 10): *Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler.*

Reply Obj. 1. Movement is *the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover.* Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (Q. XLVII., AA. 1, 2; Q. XLVIII., A. 2), and not by a diversity of governors.

Reply Obj. 2. Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

Reply Obj. 3. If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition of good is possible.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT IS ONE OR MANY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world, and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists

in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

Obj. 2. Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

Obj. 3. Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* xii.): *God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness*. But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good: and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number.

Reply Obj. 1. The order of the universe includes both

the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. ix. 11): *I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favour to the skilful, but time and chance in all.* But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9): *God hath no care for oxen.* But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 3. Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 11): *Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature.* Therefore all things are subject to His government.

I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of

things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (Q. XLIV., AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. XLIV., A. 4; Q. LXV., A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, *God hath abandoned the earth* (Ezech. ix. 9).

Reply Obj. 1. These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but *time and chance,* that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

Reply Obj. 2. Government implies a certain change

effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down *Phys.* iii. 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that *God hath no care for oxen,* he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.

Reply Obj. 3. The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE IMMEDIATELY GOVERNED BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to

watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

Obj. 2. Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* viii. 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

Obj. 3. Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 4): *As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself.*

I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.

The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design, or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so

much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.

Reply Obj. 1. Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.

Reply Obj. 2. If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.

Reply Obj. 3. That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iii.) that *God disposes all for good.* Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

Obj. 3. Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the

order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

On the contrary, It is written (Esth. xiii. 9): *O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will.*

I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. XLVIII., A. 3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

Reply Obj. 2. Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, *nothing in the world happens by chance,* as Augustine declares (*QQ.* LXXXIII., qu. 24).

Reply Obj. 3. Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely

outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN RESIST THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. iii. 8): *Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord.*

Obj. 2. Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

Obj. 3. Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iii.): *There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly,* as is said (Wisd. viii.) of Divine wisdom.

I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways; in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only; *for no one acts intending evil,* as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.):

secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, *ad* 3; A. 5, *ad* 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said *to order all things sweetly*.

Reply Obj. 1. Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.

Reply Obj. 3. From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

QUESTION CIV.

THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God? (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God? (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness? (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?

First Article.

WHETHER CREATURES NEED TO BE KEPT IN BEING BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (Q. L., AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. LXVI., A. 2). Therefore such creatures

as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

Obj. 2. Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.

Obj. 4. Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. i. 3): *Upholding all things by the word of His power.*

I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in

two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another *per se* and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (*Moral.* xvi.).

This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the *becoming* of its effect, but not directly of its *being*. This may be seen both in artificial and in natural things: for the builder causes the house in its *becoming*, but he is not the direct cause of its *being*. For it is clear that the *being* of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the *being* of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its *becoming* depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of *being* which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its *becoming* only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially

the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—in other words, it may be the case that *this matter* receives *this form*. And this is to be the cause of *becoming*, as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the *becoming* of the effect, but not its *being*, depends on the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of *becoming* but also the cause of *being*.

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the *becoming* of the effect: so neither can the *being* of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in *becoming* but also in *being*. This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has no root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air

is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being by virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* iv. 12): *If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.* In the same work (viii. 12) he says: *As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.*

Reply Obj. 1. *Being* naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of *being* but only of *becoming*.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4. The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.

Second Article.

WHETHER GOD PRESERVES EVERY CREATURE IMMEDIATELY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A. 1, *ad* 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

Obj. 3. Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its *becoming,* but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their *becoming,* for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. XLV., A. 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and *per se,* by the fact that on it depends the other's being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it

necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect, which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* xii., Did. xi. 6), that the first, namely the diurnal, movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply Obj. 1. God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.

Reply Obj. 2. Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.

Reply Obj. 3. No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.

Third Article.

WHETHER GOD CAN ANNIHILATE ANYTHING?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (*QQ*. LXXXIII., qu. 21) that *God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence*. But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

Obj. 2. Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* i. 32): *Because God is good, we exist.* But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything.

Obj. 3. Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. x. 24): *Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.*

I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (Q. XIX., A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the catholic faith, which confesses that God created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. cxxxiv. 6: *Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.* Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was

free not to give them existence, and so not to make them; so after they have been made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.

Reply Obj. 1. Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.

Reply Obj. 2. God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.

Reply Obj. 3. If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING IS ANNIHILATED?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 2. Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii. 10) that, *a finite power cannot move in infinite time.* Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 3. Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. iii. 14): *I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever.*

I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (Q. CV., A. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, *To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit* (1 Cor. xii. 7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.

Reply Obj. 1. That things were brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle; *Upholding all things by the word of His power* (Heb. i. 3).

Reply Obj. 2. A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the

Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something *of a being;* for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.

QUESTION CV.

OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE now consider the second effect of the Divine government, *i.e.*, the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form? (2) Whether He can immediately move a body? (3) Whether He can move the intellect? (4) Whether He can move the will? (5) Whether God works in every worker? (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things? (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous? (8) Of the diversity of miracles.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE THE MATTER IMMEDIATELY TO THE FORM?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* vii., Did. vi. 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

Obj. 2. Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher

says (*De Anima* iii. 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.

Obj. 3. As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above (Q. CIV., A. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7): *God formed man of the slime of the earth.*

I answer that, God can move matter immediately to a form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.

Reply Obj. 1. An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (Q. XIV., A. 2; Q. XLIV., A. 2); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the

power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.

Second Article.

WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE A BODY IMMEDIATELY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vii. 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and the moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body; for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.): *There is no contact with God.* Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 2. Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii. 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immedi-

ately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we have explained above (Q. XXV., A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately, among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen. i. 9: *Let the waters be gathered together into one place.* Therefore God can move a body immediately.

I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A. 1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

Reply Obj. 1. There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, *There is no contact with God;* that is, so that God Himself be touched.

Reply Obj. 2. God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved;

but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher (*Phys.* viii. 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power *of bulk,* by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power *of bulk,* would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

Third Article.

Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in *Metaph.* ix. (Did. viii. 8). But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.

Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii. 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.

Obj. 3. Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.

On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (Ps. xciii. 10) that God *teaches man knowledge*. Therefore God moves the human intellect.

I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since

He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 3. The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q. XII., A. 2; Q. LVI., A. 3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q. XII., A. 4).

Fourth Article.

WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE THE CREATED WILL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not

moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.

Obj. 2. Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.

Obj. 3. Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. ii. 13): *It is God who worketh in us* (Vulgate—*you*) *both to will and to accomplish.*

I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Wherefore He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but

especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2. To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3. If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (*ad* 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER GOD WORKS IN EVERY AGENT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2. Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Obj. 3. Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates.

Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxvi. 12): *Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in* (Vulgate—*for*) *us.*

I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the immediate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things, to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the

thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first: for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colours, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colours are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job x. 11: *Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.*

Reply Obj. 1. God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.

Reply Obj. 2. One action does not proceed from two

agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.

Reply Obj. 3. God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN DO ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED ORDER OF NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxvi. 3) says: *God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.* But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.

Obj. 2. Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.

Obj. 3. Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore if God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi. *ibid.*): *God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature.*

I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household;

which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi. *ibid.*): *God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself.*

Reply Obj. 1. In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (*ibid.*):

That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against such order.

Reply Obj. 3. God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever He intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHATEVER GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE NATURAL ORDER IS MIRACULOUS?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle.

Obj. 2. Further, a miracle is *something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment.** But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts v. 15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things that are outside the course of nature are miraculous.

* St. Augustine, *De utilitate credendi* xvi.

Obj. 3. Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi. 3): *Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle.*

I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his *Metaphysics.* Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply Obj. 1. Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.

Reply Obj. 2. An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and

order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope *of nature*, not above the hope *of grace*, which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE MIRACLE IS GREATER THAN ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (*Epist. ad Volusian.* cxxxvii.): *In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer.* But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

Obj. 2. Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (Jo. xiv. 12): *The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do.*

I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Isa. xl. 15: *Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance.* But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater is the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do;

and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.

From this it is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.

QUESTION CVI.

HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual co-ordination, both of the good and of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment? (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another? (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?

First Article.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL ENLIGHTENS ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. xxxi. 34: *They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every*

man his brother. Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

Obj. 2. Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature, by the Creator; in the light of grace, by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.

Obj. 3. Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is *informed by God alone, without created intervention,* as Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII., qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that *the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy.*

I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. v. 13: *All that is made manifest is light.* Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph. iii. 8): *To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God.* Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.): *Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds.*

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (Q. CV., A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighbourhood of a more perfect body,—for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so

the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighbourhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.): *Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy.*

Reply Obj. 1. All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: *They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest.* But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), that the angels *are enlightened by the types of existing things.*

Reply Obj. 2. An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him

the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form.

Second Article.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL MOVES ANOTHER ANGEL'S WILL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to the will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.

Obj. 2. Further, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.): *The names of the angels designate their properties.* Now the Seraphim are so called because they *kindle* or *give heat:* and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii. 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.

On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. CV., A. 4), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (*ibid.*), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: *Show me Thy glory,* answered: *I will show thee all good* (Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.

Reply Obj. 1. Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above (A. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius

says (*Eccl. Hier.* vi.): that *in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening on things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge.* For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the coloured object.

Reply Obj. 2. One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite, which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels.

Third Article.

WHETHER AN INFERIOR ANGEL CAN ENLIGHTEN A SUPERIOR ANGEL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called *our mother* (Gal. iv. 26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiv. 31): *You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted.* Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

Obj. 2. Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (Q. CV., A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore he also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferiors otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that

way the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

Obj. 3. Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that *this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior* (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.; *Eccl. Hier.* v.).

I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained (Q. CV., A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.

Reply Obj. 1. The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not con-

spicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

Reply Obj. 2. As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order in the angels.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER THE SUPERIOR ANGEL ENLIGHTENS THE INFERIOR AS REGARDS ALL HE HIMSELF KNOWS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xii.), that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.

Obj. 2. Further, the Master of the *Sentences* says (II. 11) that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: *Who is this King of glory?* other angels, who knew, answered: *The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory,* as Dionysius expounds (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.

Obj. 3. Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior

angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.

On the contrary, Gregory* says: *In that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually.* And Dionysius says: *Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior* (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.), as quoted above (A. 1).

I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying: *As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God* (1 Pet. iv. 10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply Obj. 1. The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2. The Master's words are not to be so understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation; but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they

* Peter Lombard, 2 *Sent.*, D. ix. *Cf.* Gregory, *Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*

progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was accomplished.

Reply Obj. 3. Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.

QUESTION CVII.

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE now consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether one angel speaks to another? (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior? (3) Whether an angel speaks to God? (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance? (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ANGEL SPEAKS TO ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xviii.) that, in the state of the resurrection *each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows*. Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another.

Obj. 2. Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

Obj. 3. Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 1): *If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels.*

I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.): *It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech.*

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (Q. LXXXII., A. 4), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv. 6, 7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, *which anyone uses when he wills.* So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called *the interior word.* And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.

Reply Obj. 1. Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 Cor. ii. 11: *What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?* The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's

knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once made known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (*Moral.* ii.): *To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are.* But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.

Reply Obj. 2. External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INFERIOR ANGEL SPEAKS TO THE SUPERIOR?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. xiii. 1), *If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels,* a gloss

remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (Q. CVI., A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.

Obj. 2. Further, as was said above (Q. CVI., A. 1), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.): *God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things.* But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.

On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.), the inferior angels said to the superior: *Who is this King of Glory?*

I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: *Heaven was created by God;* or, *Man is an animal.* The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment,

but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: *I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that.* The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand, does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.

From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL SPEAKS TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.

Obj. 2. Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an

angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Zach. i. 12): *The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem.* Therefore an angel speaks to God.

I answer that, As was said above (AA. 1, 2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) that *the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.*

Reply Obj. 1. Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LOCAL DISTANCE INFLUENCES THE ANGELIC SPEECH?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i. 13): *An angel works where he is.* But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place.

Obj. 2. Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that *they cried one to another* (Isa. vi. 3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.

On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke xvi. 24). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.

I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the *here and now.* For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the *here and now,* except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from *here and now,* neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.

Reply Obj. 1. The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, *ad* 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.

Reply Obj. 2. The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.): *The less one desires, the less one cries out.*

Fifth Article.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS KNOW WHAT ONE SPEAKS TO ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.

Obj. 2. Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all.

Obj. 3. Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.): *Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others.* Therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all.

On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.

I answer that, As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle

of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.

From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.

QUESTION CVIII.

OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (Q. CVI., A. 3), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.

Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy? (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order? (3) Whether in one order there are many angels? (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural? (5) Of the names and properties of each order. (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another. (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment? (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

First Article.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS ARE OF ONE HIERARCHY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (*Metaph.* xii., Did. xi. 10, *Polit.* iii. 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.) that

hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action. But all the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 3. Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.

On the contrary, Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vi.) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.

I answer that, Hierarchy means a *sacred* principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xii. 1): *There are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked.* But if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be *one* accordingly as the multitude can be subject in *one* way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* i.). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (Q. LV., A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the

angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as proceeding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, *as it were, placed in the vestibule of God,* as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the *supercelestial* hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.): *The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect;* which far be it from us to apply to the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection considers on the part of the prince, forasmuch as the multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

Reply Obj. 2. As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way—that is, in His Essence—there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does not apply to both.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORDERS IN ONE HIERARCHY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many.

Obj. 2. Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for *nothing is possessed individually* (2 *Sent.* ix.). Therefore there are not different orders of angels.

Obj. 3. Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of *cleansing, enlightening,* and *perfecting.* For the order of deacons is *cleansing,* the order of priests is *enlightening,* and of bishops *perfecting,* as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* v.). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. i. 20, 21) that *God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion:* which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6).

I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.

This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices

and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labour in the fields, and so forth.

But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class (*populus honorabilis*). In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three—namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (*Cœl. Hier.* vi.).

Reply Obj. 1. Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.

Reply Obj. 2. All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect than what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies; as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices and actions.

Reply Obj. 3. The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, *He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he*—namely, John the Baptist, than whom *there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women* (Matt. xi.

11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE MANY ANGELS IN ONE ORDER?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (Q. L., A. 4), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.

Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous.

Obj. 3. Further, it was said above (*Obj.* 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order.

On the contrary, It is written: *The Seraphim cried to one another* (Isa. vi. 3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.

I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way,

and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders.

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vi.). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 1. All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* x.) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.

Reply Obj. 2. That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 3. As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DISTINCTION OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS COMES FROM THE ANGELIC NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is *a sacred principality,* and Dionysius places in its definition that *it approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be* (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the Seraphim are called *burning* or *kindling,* as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for *it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us* (Rom. v. 5): *which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels,* as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xii.). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace.

Obj. 3. Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

On the contrary, The Master says (ii., D. 9) that *an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts.* Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that

they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. LXII., A. 6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER THE ORDERS OF THE ANGELS ARE PROPERLY NAMED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, *Know ye that the Lord He is God* (Ps. xcix. 3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called *Dominations.*

Obj. 3. Further, the name *Domination* seems to imply government, and likewise the names *Principalities* and *Powers.* Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.

Obj. 4. Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the *Principalities.*

Obj. 5. Further, the name *Seraphim* is derived from ardour, which pertains to charity; and the name *Cherubim* from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

Obj. 6. Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to be any order of *Thrones* besides the *Cherubim* and *Seraphim*. Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled.

On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name *Seraphim* is found in Isaias vi. 2; the name *Cherubim* in Ezechiel i. (*cf.* x. 15, 20); *Thrones* in Colossians i. 16; *Dominations, Virtues, Powers,* and *Principalities* are mentioned in Ephesians i. 21; the name *Archangels* in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name *Angels* is found in many places of Scripture.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in co-ordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Q. XIII., A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a *rational substance,* but not an

intellectual substance, which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to a man by participation; nor do we call him a *sensible substance,* which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Evang.*) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that *angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves.*

Reply Obj. 1. Angel means *messenger.* So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called *angels.* But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* v.). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of *angels,* forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.

Virtue can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the

operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also *heavenly essences*. Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the *name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength;* first, in regard of those Divine operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.

Reply Obj. 2. As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* xii.): *Domination is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts.* Hence Dionysius also states (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the name *Domination* means first *a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression,* endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies *a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants.* Thirdly, it signifies *the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God.* Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name *Virtues* signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.

Reply Obj. 3. The names *Domination, Power,* and *Principality* belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (*Hom.* xxiv. *in Evang.*), that *some companies of the angels, because others are subject in obedience to them, are called dominations.* The name *Power* points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, *He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God* (Rom. xiii. 2). And so Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the name *Power* signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the

Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the order of *Powers* it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside (*principari*) as Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) is *to be first among others*, as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* ix.) that the name of *Principalities* signifies *one who leads in a sacred order*. For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called *princes*, according to the words, *Princes went before joined with singers* (Ps. lxvii. 26).

Reply Obj. 4. The *Archangels*, according to Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* ix.), are between the *Principalities* and the *Angels*. A medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. So the *Archangels* are called the *angel princes;* forasmuch as they are princes as regards the *Angels*, and angels as regards the principalities. But according to Gregory (*loc. cit.*) they are called *Archangels*, because they preside over the one order of the *Angels;* as it were, announcing greater things: and the *Principalities* are so called as presiding over all the heavenly *Virtues* who fulfil the Divine commands.

Reply Obj. 5. The name *Seraphim* does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardour or fire. Hence Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) expounds the name *Seraphim* according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is *heat*, which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervour; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervour, and cleans-

ing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly, we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.

In the same way the name *Cherubim* comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted *fulness of knowledge,* which Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.

Reply Obj. 6. The order of the *Thrones* excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; whereas the *Cherubim* have the excellence of knowledge and the *Seraphim* the excellence of ardour. And although these two excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the *Thrones* does not include the other two; and so the order of the *Thrones* is distinguished from the orders of the *Cherubim* and the *Seraphim.* For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (*ibid.*) explains the name *Thrones* by its relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and so the angels who are called *Thrones* are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case: for the angels themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.

Sixth Article.

WHETHER THE GRADES OF THE ORDERS ARE PROPERLY ASSIGNED?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of *Dominations, Principalities,* and *Powers* of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought to be supreme.

Obj. 2. Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of *Thrones* is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the *Thrones* is the highest.

Obj. 3. Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of *Cherubim* seems to be higher than the *Seraphim.*

Obj. 4. Further, Gregory (*Hom.* xxiv. *in Evang.*) places the *Principalities* above the *Powers.* These therefore are not placed immediately above the archangels, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* ix.).

On the contrary, Dionysius (*ibid.* vii.), places in the highest hierarchy the *Seraphim* as the first, the *Cherubim* as the middle, the *Thrones* as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the *Dominations,* as the first, the *Virtues* in the middle, the *Powers* last; in the lowest hierarchy the *Principalities* first, then the *Archangels,* and lastly the *Angels.*

I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (*loc. cit.*) and Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.), who agree as regards all except the *Principalities* and *Virtues.* For Dionysius places the *Virtues* beneath the *Dominations,* and above the *Powers;* the *Principalities* beneath the *Powers* and above the *Archangels.* Gregory, however, places the *Principalities* between the *Dominations* and the *Powers;* and the *Virtues* between the *Powers* and the *Archangels.* Each of these placings may claim authority

from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. i. 20, 21) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest, saying that *God set Him, i.e.*, Christ, *on His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion.* Here he places *Virtues* between *Powers* and *Dominations*, according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (i. 16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: *Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in Him.* Here he places the *Principalities* between *Dominations* and *Powers*, as does also Gregory.

Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and the third in their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the *Seraphim, Cherubim,* and *Thrones;* and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition;—the *Dominations, Virtues,* and *Powers;* and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the *Principalities, Angels* and *Archangels.*

As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end of

creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* xii., Did. xi. 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the *Thrones* are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The *Cherubim* know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the *Seraphim* excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the *Thrones;* as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called *Angels.*

As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs to the *Dominations;* the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the *Virtues;* the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which belongs to the *Powers.*

The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the *Principalities.* There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the *Angels.* Others hold a middle place; and these are the *Archangels,* as above explained.

This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love

proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the *Thrones,* who in their own order are akin to the dominations; for the *Thrones,* according to Gregory (*loc. cit.*), are so called *because through them God accomplishes His judgments,* since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations.—The order of the *Powers* is akin to the order of the *Principalities;* for as it belongs to the *Powers* to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of *Principalities,* who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; *for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man* (*Ethic.* i. 2); and hence it is written, *The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me* (Dan. x. 13).

The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the *Dominations* appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.), *bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit.* So the first order after the *Dominations* is called that of *Principalities,* who rule even over good spirits; then the *Powers,* who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. xiii. 3, 4). After these come the *Virtues,* who have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the *Angels* and the *Archangels,* who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The angels' subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is

derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God.

Reply Obj. 2. The nearness to God designated by the name of the *Thrones,* belongs also to the *Cherubim* and *Seraphim,* and in a more excellent way, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. As above explained (Q. XXVII., A. 3), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.

Reply Obj. 4. A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name *Principalities* from their *presiding over good spirits,* which also agrees with the *Virtues* accordingly as this name expresses a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the *Virtues* seem to be the same as the *Principalities* of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the archangels and the angels.

Seventh Article.

WHETHER THE ORDERS WILL OUTLAST THE DAY OF JUDGMENT?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 24), that Christ will *bring to naught all princi-*

pality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father; and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all other orders will be abolished in that state.

Obj. 2. Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.

Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. i. 14), that *they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation;* whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (Judg. v. 20): *Stars remaining in their order and courses,* which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders.

I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4); and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

Reply Obj. 1. The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, *When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father, i.e.,* when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.

Reply Obj. 3. Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE TAKEN UP INTO THE ANGELIC ORDERS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 2. Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 3. Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (*Hom.* xxviii. *in Matt.*). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.

On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, *they will be as the angels of God* (Matt. xxii. 30).

I answer that, As above explained (AA. 4, 7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Luke xx. 36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of

nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the others will constitute their own order, as it were corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (*Civ. Dei* xii. 9), that *there will not be two societies of men and of angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone.*

Reply Obj. 1. Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (A. 4; Q. LXII., A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, *nor do they interfere in the things of the living,* as Augustine says (*De cura pro mortuis* xiii., xvi.). Still, by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (*ibid.*, xvi.).

Reply Obj. 3. It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.

QUESTION CIX.

THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are orders among the demons? (2) Whether among them there is precedence? (3) Whether one enlightens another? (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?

First Article.

WHETHER THERE ARE ORDERS AMONG THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (*De Nat. Boni* iii.); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.

Obj. 3. Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called *Seraphim*, or *Thrones*, or *Dominations*. Therefore

on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. vi. 12): *Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.*

I answer that, As explained above (Q. CVIII., AA. 4, 7, 8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.

If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at that time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (Q. LXII., A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.).

Reply Obj. 1. Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (Q. XLIX., A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.

Reply Obj. 2. If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.

Reply Obj. 3. The name *Seraphim* is given from the ardour of charity; and the name *Thrones* from the Divine indwelling; and the name *Dominations* imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AMONG THE DEMONS THERE IS PRECEDENCE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them

Obj. 2. Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, *Among the proud there are always contentions* (Prov. xiii. 10). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

Obj. 3. If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature, but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

On the contrary, On 1 Cor. xv. 24 the gloss says: *While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons.*

I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence;—that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate.

So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which *reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly* (Wisd. viii. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.

Reply Obj. 2. The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness, whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 3. The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.

Third Article.

WHETHER THERE IS ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

Obj. 2. Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing

and perfecting, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 1). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: *What can be made clean by the unclean?* (Ecclus. xxxiv. 4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.

I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (Q. CVII., A 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described,

Reply Obj. 2. According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above expounded (Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LVIII., A. 2; Q. LXXIX., A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GOOD ANGELS HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER THE BAD ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is espcially connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.

Obj. 2. Further, superiors are responsible as regards

negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted.

Obj. 3. Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.), that *the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life;* and Gregory says (*Hom.* xxxiv.) that *the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers.*

I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

Reply Obj. 1. Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil, or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 2. The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of

the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, *the spiritual man judgeth all things* (1 Cor. ii. 15), and the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 4; x. 5) that *the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts.*

QUESTION CX.

HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels? (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally? (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?

First Article.

WHETHER THE CORPOREAL CREATURE IS GOVERNED BY THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by the angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic

offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q. CVIII., A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 4) that *all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life;* and Gregory says (*Dial.* iv. 6), that *in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature.*

I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (Q. LV., A. 3; Q. CVIII., A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the *here and now;* whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.

Reply. Obj. 1. Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (*Metaph.* xi. 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavoured to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that

any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the *active intelligence*.

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII., qu. 79): *Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it;* and Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* ii. 4): *The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order;* and Origen says on the text, *When the ass saw the angel* (Num. xxii. 23), that *the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things* (*Hom.* xiv. *in Num.*). The reason of this, however, is not that an

angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal thing: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (Q. CVIII., A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the *powers;* so to the order of the *virtues* do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CORPOREAL MATTER OBEYS THE MERE WILL OF AN ANGEL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is

something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes at length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone.*

I answer that, The Platonists* asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter, proceed from the concept of the *intellect;* and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made *per se,* so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* vii., Did. vi. 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the *composite:* for this, properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be made is nothing but the way to existence.

Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole *composite* as to both matter and form

* *Phædo* xlix.: *Tim.* (Did.), vol. ii., p. 218.

is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or from some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.

Reply Obj. 1. Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.

Reply Obj. 3. There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER BODIES OBEY THE ANGELS AS REGARDS LOCAL MOTION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher (*Phys.* viii. 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.

Obj. 3. Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 8, 9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.): *Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second.* Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii. *loc. cit.*). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic—that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.

Reply Obj. 1. There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances.

Reply Obj. 2. The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to anybody; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS CAN WORK MIRACLES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*): *Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done.*

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII.; qu. 79) that *magicians work miracles by private contract; good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the signs of public justice.* But magicians work miracles because they are *heard by the demons,* as he says elsewhere in the same work.* Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says in the same work* that *it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere.* But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.

Obj. 4. Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.

On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. cxxxv. 4): *Who alone doth great wonders.*

* *Cf. Liber* xxi. *Sentent.,* sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine.

I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.

Reply Obj. 1. Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.

Reply Obj. 2. Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole of created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called *miracles* not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by *private contract,* forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by *public justice:* but bad Christians by *the signs of public justice,* as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.

Reply Obj. 3. Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.

QUESTION CXI.

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power. (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men. (3) How they guard and protect men. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect? (2) Whether he can change man's will? (3) Whether he can change man's imagination? (4) Whether he can change man's senses?

First Article.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN ENLIGHTEN MAN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* iii.) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as *the sacrament of faith.* But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. ii. 8: *By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.* Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.

Obj. 2. Further, on the words, *God hath manifested it to them* (Rom. i. 19), the gloss observes that *not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work,* that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment, as we have stated (Q. CVI., A. 1; Q. CVII., A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.

I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Q. CIX., A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.

The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. CVI., A. 1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (*ibid.*).

The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* i.), that, *It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils.* On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.

Reply Obj. 1. Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed

to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine says, *No one believes except willingly*. In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. x. 17, *Faith cometh by hearing;* principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done.

Reply Obj. 2. Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS CAN CHANGE THE WILL OF MAN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, *Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire* (Heb. i. 7), the gloss notes that *they are fire, as being spiritually fervent,*

and as burning away our vices. This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.

Obj. 2. Further, Bede says (*Super Matth.* xv. 11), that, *the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them.* Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that *every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men* (*De Fid. Orth.* ii. 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.

Obj. 3. Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.

On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. xxi. 1: *The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it.*

I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.

Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way,—by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. CVI., A. 2).

In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

Reply Obj. 1. Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.

Reply Obj. 2. The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling *a putting in,* because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3. The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Third Article.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN CHANGE MAN'S IMAGINATION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said *De Anima* iii., is *a motion caused by the sense in act.* But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. CX., A. 2). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 12): *One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other.* But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.

Obj. 4. Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination.

On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Matt. i. 20; ii. 13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.

I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Q. CX., A. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humours. Hence Aristotle says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*),* when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that *when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it,* that is, the impressions left from the move-

* *De Insomniis* iii.

ments of sensible things, which movements are preserved in the animal spirits, *and move the sensitive principle;* so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humours may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humours, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.

Reply Obj. 1. The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine colour. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.

Reply Obj. 2. An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine colour), but by local movement of the spirits and humours, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.

Reply Obj. 4. An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect of him to whom such things appear.

Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN CHANGE THE HUMAN SENSES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.

Obj. 3. Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. CX., A. 4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object.

On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, *struck the people of Sodom with blindness* or *ἀορασία*,* *so that they could not find the door* (Gen. xix. 11). The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings vi. 18).

I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humours are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric humour, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can

* It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word *ἀορασία* appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom—namely, dazzling (French version, *éblouissement*), which the Latin *cæcitas* (blindness) does not necessarily imply.

work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. LI., A. 2). Likewise he can move the spirits and humours from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.

Reply Obj. 1. The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. By the interior movement of the spirits and humours an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 3. An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.

QUESTION CXII.

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry? (2) Whether all are sent? (3) Whether those who are sent, assist? (4) From what orders they are sent.

First Article.

WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE SENT ON WORKS OF MINISTRY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the *here* and *now*. Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.

Obj. 2. Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.

Obj. 3. Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: *He that is less in action, shall receive wisdom* (Ecclus. xxxviii. 25). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is unfitting.

Obj. 4. Further, to minister is the part of an inferior;

hence it is written (Luke xxii. 27): *Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?* But the angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxiii. 20): *Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee.*

I answer that, From what has been said above (Q. CVIII., A. 6), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated (Q. XLIII., A. 1), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. VIII., A. 1). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is *here* in such a manner as not to be *there*. But it is clear from what was above stated (Q. CX., A. 1), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.

Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called *ministries;* and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.

Reply Obj. 1. An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv. 20): *Even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are not in this world.* In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place.

Reply Obj. 2. The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.

Reply Obj. 3. In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates his exterior actions by the intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation; because, given two actions, one of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) that *the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.*

Reply Obj. 4. In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. ii. 3): *Esteeming others better than themselves.*

Second Article.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS ARE SENT IN MINISTRY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb. i. 14): *All are ministering spirits, sent to minister* (Vulg., *Are they not all . . . ?*)

Obj. 2. Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (Q. CVIII., A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Isa. vi. 6, 7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.

Obj. 3. Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent.

Obj. 4. Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (Q. L., A. 4), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, *Thousands of thousands ministered to Him* (Dan. vii. 10).

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*), quoting the statement of Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* xiii.), that *the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service.*

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (Q. CVI., A. 3; Q. CX., A. 1), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are administered by the superior. By the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and

bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds into rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.

This, however, does not seem to be reasonable; because the angelic order is according to the gifts of grace. Now the order of grace has no order above itself for the sake of which it should be passed over; as the order of nature is passed over for the sake of grace. It may likewise be observed that the order of nature in the working of miracles is passed over for the confirmation of faith; which purpose would receive no additional strength if the angelic order were passed over, since this could not be perceived by us. Further, there is nothing in the Divine ministries above the capacity of the inferior orders. Hence Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) that *those who announce the highest things are called archangels*. For this reason *the archangel Gabriel was sent to the Virgin Mary:* and yet, as he says further on, this was the greatest of all the Divine ministries. Thus with Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* xiii.) we must say, without any distinction, that the superior angels are never sent to the external ministry.

Reply Obj. 1. As in the missions of the Divine Persons there is a visible mission, in regard to the corporeal creature, and an invisible mission, in regard to a spiritual effect; so likewise in the angelic missions, there is an external mission, in respect of some administration of corporeal things—and on such a mission not all the angels are sent,—and an interior mission, in respect of some intellectual effect, just as one angel enlightens another—and in this way all the angels are sent.

It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that

Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.

Reply Obj. 2. According to Dionysius (*ibid.*), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a *Seraph*, that is, *kindling* in an equivocal sense, because he came to *kindle* the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.

Reply Obj. 3. The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been said (Q. XLIII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 4. A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries.

Third Article.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS WHO ARE SENT, ASSIST?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*): *So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited.*

Obj. 2. Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, *I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord* (Tob. xii. 15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.

Obj. 3. Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to Job. i. 6: *When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them.* Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.

Obj. 4. Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of Dan. vii. 10: *Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him.* Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.

On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job xxv. 3: *Is there any numbering of His soldiers?* (*Moral.* xvii.): *Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men.* Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.

I answer that, The angels are spoken of as *assisting* and *administering,* after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance—for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to assist.

We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) that *those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father.* Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God.

From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.

Reply Obj. 3. Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.), *though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels.*

Reply Obj. 4. All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS OF THE SECOND HIERARCHY ARE SENT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Daniel vii. 10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xvii.) that *there are more who minister than who assist.* This would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* viii.) that the *Dominations are above all subjection.* But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.

I answer that, As above stated (A. 1), to be sent to

external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name *dominations* does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the *Angels* and *Archangels* are so called from *announcing;* the *Virtues* and *Powers* are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the *Prince*, according to what Gregory says (*Hom.* xxxiv. in *Ev.*), *be first among the workers.* Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.

Reply Obj. 1. The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.

Reply Obj. 2. A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Dan. vii. 10) *thousands of thousands ministered to Him,* not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean *thousands out of thousands;* thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, *and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him.* This explanation rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.

Dionysius, however (*Cœl. Hier.* xiv.) declares that the

multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, the words *thousands of thousands* are taken by way of multiplication, to signify *a thousand times a thousand*. And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said *ten times a hundred thousand* it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written *ten thousand times a hundred thousand,* we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.

QUESTION CXIII.

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS

(*In Eight Articles.*)

We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels? (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel? (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels? (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian? (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin? (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men? (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded? (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?

First Article.

WHETHER MEN ARE GUARDED BY THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.

Obj. 2. Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to Ps. cxx. 4: *He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel.* Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.

Obj. 3. Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: *Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life* (3 Kings xx. 39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xc. 11): *He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways.*

I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.

Reply Obj. 1. By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wisd. ix. 14): *The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.* Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

Reply Obj. 2. Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of moral virtue. Secondly, that reason

should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi.) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q. CXI., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EACH MAN IS GUARDED BY AN ANGEL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.

Obj. 2. Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv., xiii.). But as all the angels are unequal (Q. L., A. 4), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men.

Obj. 3. Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* x.), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.

On the contrary, On the text, *Their angels in heaven,* etc. (Matt. viii. 10), Jerome says: *Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth.*

I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*), the different orders are deputed to the different *genera* of things, for instance the *Powers* to coerce the demons, the *Virtues* to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.

Reply Obj. 1. A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his

own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.

Reply Obj. 2. As above stated (Q. CXII., A. 3, *ad* 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but, as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.

Reply Obj. 3. Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. xxxiii. 11, 12: *With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low.* Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO GUARD MEN BELONGS ONLY TO THE LOWEST ORDER OF ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the text (Matt. xviii. 10), *Their angels in heaven*, etc., is to be understood not of any angels, but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard men.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says that angels *are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation* (Heb. i. 14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry (Q. CXII., A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.

Obj. 3. Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.

On the contrary, In the Psalm (xc.) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* v., ix.).

I answer that, As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the *lesser things;* for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of *Principalities,* or perhaps to the *Archangels,* whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled *one of the princes* (Dan. x. 13). Moreover all corporeal natures are guarded by the *Virtues;* and likewise the demons by the *Powers,* and the good spirits by the *Principalities,* according to Gregory's opinion (*loc. cit.*).

Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* x.) in each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God for the higher degree of glory.

Reply Obj. 2. Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are

executors of the superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANGELS ARE APPOINTED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ALL MEN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. ii. 7) that He was *made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.* If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 2. Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 3. Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. Infidels also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention: for *faith directs the intention* as Augustine says (*Enarr.* ii. *in* Ps. xxxi). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be *according to the working of Satan,* as it is written (2 Thess. ii. 9). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.

On the contrary is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A. 2), for he says that *each soul has an angel appointed to guard it.*

I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it

were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to Ps. clxi. 4: *In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me.* And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not to be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, he was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He should have, not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt. iv. 11) that *angels came and ministered to Him.*

Reply Obj. 2. In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we have said above (Q. XCV., AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race,—namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ANGEL IS APPOINTED TO GUARD A MAN FROM HIS BIRTH?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are *sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation*, as the Apostle says (Heb. i. 14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.

Obj. 2. Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born.

Obj. 3. Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.

On the contrary, Jerome says (*vide* A. 4) that *each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth.*

I answer that, As Origen observes (*Tract.* v. *super Matt.*) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (*loc. cit.*), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very

moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.

Reply Obj. 1. Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn from others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.

Reply Obj. 2. Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.

Reply Obj. 3. As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted, says.

Sixth Article.

WHETHER THE ANGEL GUARDIAN EVER FORSAKES A MAN?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. li. 9) in the person of the angels: *We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her.* And (Isa. v. 5) it is written: *I will take away the hedge*—that is, *the guardianship of the angels* (gloss)—*and it shall be wasted.*

Obj. 2. Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to

Ps. xxi. 2: *O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?* Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orth.* ii. 3), *When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven.* But sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.

On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet. v. 8: *Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.* Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.

I answer that, As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation.

From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in an instant.

Seventh Article.

WHETHER ANGELS GRIEVE FOR THE ILLS OF THOSE WHOM THEY GUARD?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Isa. xxxiii. 7): *The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.* But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 15), *sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.* But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.

Obj. 3. Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Luke xv. 7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.

Obj. 4. Further, on Numbers xviii. 12: *Whatsoever first-fruits they offer,* etc., the gloss of Origen says: *The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault.* But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.

On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. xxi. 4): *Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow.* But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.

I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (*loc. cit.*) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice;

while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, *i.e.*, the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Isa. xxxvii. 2 *seqq.*: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the *angels of peace* are the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels.

The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence.

Reply Obj. 4. The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.

Eighth Article.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE STRIFE OR DISCORD AMONG THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job xxv. 2): *Who maketh peace in His high places.* But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife.

Obj. 2. Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. x. 13): *The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days.* But this prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them.

I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

But according to Gregory (*Moral.* xvii.), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the

guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them : and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another : not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

QUESTION CXIV.

OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS.

(In Five Articles.)

We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons? (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil? (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons? (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray? (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?

First Article.

WHETHER MEN ARE ASSAILED BY THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.

Obj. 2. Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.

Obj. 3. Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect

to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. vi. 12): *Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places.*

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons—the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavour to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

Reply Obj. 1. The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings (xxii. 20). For punishment is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.

Reply Obj. 2. In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings vi. 16), Eliseus said to his servant: *Fear not, for there are more with us than with them.*

Reply Obj. 3. The assault of the flesh and the world

would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

Second Article.

WHETHER TO TEMPT IS PROPER TO THE DEVIL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Genesis xxii. 1, *God tempted Abraham.* Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.

Obj. 2. Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

Obj. 3. Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (Q. CXI., A. 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. iii. 5): *Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you:* to which the gloss adds, *that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt.*

I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to

tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something: and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for though at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Deut. xiii. 3): *The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love Him.*

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of a man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the *weigher of spirits* (Prov. xvi. 2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.

Reply Obj. 3. Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (Q. CXI., A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

Third Article.

WHETHER ALL SINS ARE DUE TO THE TEMPTATION OF THE DEVIL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.* And Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii. 4) that *all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil.*

Obj. 2. Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (Jo. viii. 44): *You are of your father the devil.* But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.

Obj. 3. Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil.

On the contrary, It is written (*De Eccl. Dogmat.* xlix.): *Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will.*

I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way

the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (*Peri Archon* iii.), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and suchlike pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires be curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates *through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents,* as Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* iii.).

Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEMONS CAN LEAD MEN ASTRAY BY MEANS OF REAL MIRACLES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess. ii. 9), his *coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and*

signs, and lying wonders. Much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders.

Obj. 2. Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xviii. 18): *I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power.* Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.

Obj. 3. Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mark xvi. 20): *The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.*

On the contrary, Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII.):* *Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above (Q. CX., A. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvellous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And *when fire came down from heaven*

* *Lib. xxi. Sent.*, sent. 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine.

and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children—these were the work of Satan, not phantoms; as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xx. 19).

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, *either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him.*

Reply Obj. 2. As we have said above (Q. CX., A. 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 8, 9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformations of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.

Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise than it is, as explained above (Q. CXI., AA. 3, 4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same

way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xviii., *loc. cit.*): *Man's imagination, which, whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal.* This is not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII., qu. 79): *When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The former do it for their own glory: the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts: the latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject.*

Fifth Article.

WHETHER A DEMON WHO IS OVERCOME BY MAN, IS FOR THIS REASON HINDERED FROM MAKING FURTHER ASSAULTS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.

Obj. 2. Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.

On the contrary, It is written (Matt. iv. 11): *Then the devil left Him, i.e.,* Christ Who overcame.

I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither

to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke iv. 13) it is written: *All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time.* There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (*Super Matt. Hom.* v.),* *the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness.* The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke iv. 13: *The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat.* That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Matthew xii. 44: *I will return into my house from whence I came out.*

From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.

* In the *Opus Imperfectum,* among his supposititious works.

QUESTION CXV.

OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a body can be active? (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues? (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies? (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts? (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence? (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?

First Article.

WHETHER A BODY CAN BE ACTIVE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 9): *There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances.*

Obj. 2. Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is no substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree in beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active.

Obj. 3. Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.

Obj. 4. Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.

Obj. 5. Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for *an accident does not extend beyond its subject,* as Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix. 4). Therefore no bodies are active.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xv.) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, *it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold.*

I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on *The Fount of Life,* where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavours to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto;

and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.

But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are *the great* and *the small*, which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to be *the rare* and *the dense*. Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follow him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion con-

cerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (Q. XLV., A. 8).

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (*De Gener.* i. 8, 9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and that the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue.

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1. This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.

From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, *There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive,* that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.

Reply Obj. 3. Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (*De Cœlo et Mundo* iv. 2). Secondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly,

because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held; but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply Obj. 4. A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.

Reply Obj. 5. The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.

Second Article.

WHETHER THERE ARE ANY SEMINAL VIRTUES IN CORPOREAL MATTER?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue (*ratio*) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*De Trin.* iii. 8, 9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local move-

ment. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A. 1, *ad* 2, 4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 4. Further, there are said to be certain *causal virtues* (Augustine, *De Gen. ad lit.* v. 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 8): *Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world.*

I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii. 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word *nature* has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, *nature,* as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v., Did. iv. 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called *nativity:* and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word *nature* has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of *seminal virtues* (*seminales rationes*) to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.

These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says

(*Gen. ad lit.* vi. 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as *typal ideas*. Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in *universal causes*. Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in *particular causes*. Fourthly, they are in the *seeds* produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

Reply Obj. 1. These active and passive virtues of natural things, though not called *virtues* (*rationes*) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas (*rationes ideales*).

Reply Obj. 2. These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3. The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word *seed* covers both active and passive principles.

Reply Obj. 4. From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (*De Trin.* iii. 9) that, *as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn beings*. Nevertheless, the *typal ideas* can be called *causal virtues*, but not, strictly speaking, *seminal virtues*, because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the

passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE THE CAUSE OF WHAT IS PRODUCED IN BODIES HERE BELOW?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii. 7): *We say that they*—namely, the heavenly bodies—*are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes.*

Obj. 2. Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 3. Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 6): *Nothing is more corporeal than sex.* But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 4): *Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature.* And Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.) says that *the light of the sun conduces*

to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection.

I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.

Reply Obj. 2. The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the *rare* and the *dense;* there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.

This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same

mode of being : and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies : which is clearly false.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (*De Gener.* ii. 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body : thus the Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii. 2) that *man and the sun generate man.*

Reply Obj. 3. The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.

Reply Obj. 4. The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars : because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN ACTIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

Obj. 2. Further, everything multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.

*Obj.*3. Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii. 7) that *the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions.*

I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of

necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that *such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on* (*Odyssey* xviii. 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1. The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q. CXI., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3. The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements heavenly bodies can co-operate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-

will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that *the wise man is stronger than the stars,** forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER HEAVENLY BODIES CAN ACT ON THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matthew iv. 24 and xvii. 14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.

Obj. 2. Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.

Obj. 3. Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, *herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures,* as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x. 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

On the contrary, The demons are superior, in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the *agent is superior to the patient,* as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine

* Ptolemy, *Centiloquium,* prop. 5.

(*De Civ. Dei* x. 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that *on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars*. But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.

For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are *animals with an aerial body and a passive soul*, as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* viii. 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (A. 4). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (Q. LI., A. 1): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1. That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to *defame God's creature*, namely, the moon; as Jerome (*In Matt.* iv. 24) and Chrysostom (*Hom.* lvii. *in Matt.*) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (Q. CXIV., A. 4, *ad* 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that *the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body*, as Aristotle says:* wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb

* *De Part. Animal.* ii. 7: *De Sens. et Sensato* ii.: *De Somn. et Vigil.* iii.

man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.

Reply Obj. 2. Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 6), *the demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs;* that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honour due to God, of which they are covetous.

Sixth Article.

WHETHER HEAVENLY BODIES IMPOSE NECESSITY ON THINGS SUBJECT TO THEIR ACTION?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.

Obj. 2. Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3. Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the

effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Somn. et Vigil.**): *It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled.* Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients, who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (*Metaph.* vi., Did. v. 3) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such causes

* *De Divin. per Somn.* ii.

do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being *per se*, has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) *white* has a cause, likewise (that a man is) *musical* has a cause, but (that a being is) *white-musical* has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.

Reply Obj. 1. The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other

such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.

QUESTION CXVI.

ON FATE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Is there such a thing as fate? (2) Where is it? (3) Is it unchangeable? (4) Are all things subject to fate?

First Article.

WHETHER THERE BE SUCH A THING AS FATE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (*Hom.* x. *in Ev.*): *Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.*

Obj. 2. Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 4), *fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak;* as though things were said to happen by fate, which are 'fore-spoken' by one who decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.

On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boëthius (*De Consol.* iv.) defines fate thus: *Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order.*

I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like, as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly in-

tended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (*De Civ. Dei* v. 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (Q. XXII., A. 2).

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than *a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born.** But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. CXV., A. 4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (*ibid.* A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is

* *Cf.* St. Augustine, *loc. cit.*, 1, 8, 9.

reduced to a pre-ordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: *The digger of a grave found a treasure.* And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows of a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. CV., A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were *fore-spoken*, we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 1): *If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue.* For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine providence, whereby *nothing happens at random in the world,* as Augustine says (*QQ.* LXXXIII., qu. 24).

Second Article.

WHETHER FATE IS IN CREATED THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 1) that the

Divine will or power is called fate. But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Obj. 2. Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.

Obj. 3. Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. XXII., A. 3; Q. CIII., A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged.* Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. CIV., A. 2; Q. CX., A. 1; Q. CXIII., Q. CXIV.). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.

Reply Obj. 1. The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* v. 8) calls the *series of causes,* has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as

being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or *series, i.e.*, order, of second causes.

Reply Obj. 2. Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply Obj. 3. Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: *Thy fate draws thee.*

Third Article.

WHETHER FATE IS UNCHANGEABLE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.*

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Topic.* ii. 7): *If we be moved, what is in us is moved.* But fate is a *disposition inherent to changeable things,* as Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*). Therefore fate is changeable.

Obj. 3. Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*ibid.*) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.

I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by

Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or disposition of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Q. CXV., A. 6).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, *De Homine*). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: *If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.* Wherefore Boëthius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds,—*which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence, must also itself be unchangeable.*

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO FATE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed.* Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that

happen, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 1 *seqq.*). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*) that fate *is a disposition inherent to changeable things*. But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.) that *some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*): viz., that *those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate.* Hence it is clear that *the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate;* since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.

Reply Obj. 1. All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.

Reply Obj. 3. Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.

QUESTION CXVII.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general), and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge? (2) Whether man can teach an angel? (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter? (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?

First Article.

WHETHER ONE MAN CAN TEACH ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matt. xxiii. 8): *Be not you called Rabbi:* on which the gloss of Jerome says, *Lest you give to men the honour due to God.* Therefore to be a master is properly an honour due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.

Obj. 2. Further, if one man teaches another, this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.

Obj. 3. Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.

Obj. 4. Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom : for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 7) : *Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth.*

I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroës, commenting on *De Anima* iii., maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). From this it followed that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known : for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (*loc. cit.*).

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who

held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q. LXXIX., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (*De Anima* iii. 4).

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* viii. 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle, as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature, for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an inferior

principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (*Poster.* i. 1): *All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.*

Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q. CVI., A. 1; Q. CXI., A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (*Poster.* i. 2) that *a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge.* In this way a demonstrator causes his hearers to know.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above, the teacher only brings

exterior help, as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: *Who healeth all thy diseases* (Ps. cii. 3); so of Him is it written: *He that teacheth man knowledge* (Ps. xciii. 10), inasmuch as *the light of His countenance is signed upon us* (Ps. iv. 7), through which light all things are shown to us.

Reply Obj. 2. As Averroës argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.

Reply Obj. 3. The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.

Reply Obj. 4. The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have been his own master: because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN CAN TEACH THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men can teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 10): *That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church.*

But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.

Obj. 2. Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 1; Q. CXII., A. 3). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. i. 1, 2: *Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son.* Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that every Divine enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels. Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CVII., A. 2), the inferior angels can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words (Matt. xi. 11): *There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.* Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* v. 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: *To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace*

. . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God.—Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places—that is, through the Church. As though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it *from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together.*

It can also be explained otherwise that *what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here when it takes place and is made public,* as Augustine says further on (*ibid.*). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (*Comment. in Ep. ad Eph., loc. cit.*),—that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learnt certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2. The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3. Certain men even in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.

Third Article.

WHETHER MAN BY THE POWER OF HIS SOUL CAN CHANGE CORPOREAL MATTER?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (*Dialog.* ii. 30): *Saints work miracles, sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira.* But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.

Obj. 2. Further, on these words (Gal. iii. 1): *Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?* the gloss says that *some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children.* But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.

Obj. 3. Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 8): *Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., A. 2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in Whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (*ibid.*) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by

employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.

Reply Obj. 1. The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place: *Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says,—what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?*

Reply Obj. 2. Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the 'evil eye.'

But it has been shown above (Q. CX., A. 2) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a *menstruata*, as Aristotle says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*).*

Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 3), is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved

* *De Insomniis* ii.

with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (*ad* 2).

Fourth Article.

WHETHER THE SEPARATE HUMAN SOUL CAN MOVE BODIES AT LEAST LOCALLY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.

Obj. 2. Further, in the *Itinerary* of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (*De Anima* i. 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.

I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.

Reply Obj. 1. There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such

are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x. 11) and Chrysostom (*Hom.* xxviii. *in Matt.*) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.

QUESTION CXVIII.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL.

(In Three Articles.)

We now consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen? (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted? (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?

First Article.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE SOUL IS TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation.

Obj. 2. Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.

Obj. 3. Further, the generator begets its like: so that the

form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.

Obj. 4. Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above (Q. LXXVI., A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements,—for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Genesis i. 20: *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life.* Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.

I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (Q. LXV., A. 4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.

But this principle is false,—namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. LXXV., A. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.

Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.

Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium —in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium—in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1. The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (Q. XXV., A. 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.

Reply Obj. 2. The generating power begets not only by its own virtue, but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant gener-

ates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.

Reply Obj. 3. This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (Q. CXV., A. 3, *ad* 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that *man and the sun generate man.* Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (*De Anima* ii. 4).

Reply Obj. 4. In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.* ii. 3); but the fœtal matter is provided by the female. In this matter the vegetable soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards

the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.

Second Article.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL IS PRODUCED FROM THE SEMEN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gen. xlvi. 26): *All the souls that came out of* Jacob's *thigh, sixty-six.* But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 2. Further, as shown above (Q. LXXVI., A. 3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.* ii. 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 3. Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.

Obj. 4. Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.

Obj. 5. Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.

On the contrary, It is written in *De Eccl. Dogmat.* xiv. that *the rational soul is not engendered by coition.*

I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.

Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter, according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach to the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Gener. Animal.* ii. 3): *It follows that the intellect alone comes from without.*

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. LXXV., A. 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent, and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.

Reply Obj. 1. In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen.

Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.

Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. LXXVI., A. 3).

Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without.—But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptive of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetable soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then

come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body :—or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul : and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.

There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common : but this has been disproved above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2).

We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted : yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form ; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter : thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above (Q. CV., A. 5 ; Q. CX., A. 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.

Reply Obj. 4. Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power, the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.

Reply Obj. 5. In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur.

Third Article.

WHETHER HUMAN SOULS WERE CREATED TOGETHER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen. ii. 2): *God rested Him from all His work which He had done.* This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.

Obj. 2. Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Genesis ii. 2, where it is said that *God ended* all *His work.*

Obj. 3. Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body.

On the contrary, it is said (*De Eccl. Dogmat.* xiv., xviii.) that *the soul is created together with the body.*

I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. LXXV., A. 4). Moreover, that the

human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LXXXV., A. 1): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 6, 7; Q. LXXXV., A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without the body.

But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it,—this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since *nature does not fail in what is necessary*. Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur,—to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter.—If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting

nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (Jo. v. 17): *My Father worketh until now;* but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species.

Reply Obj. 3. That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wisd. i. 13, 16): *God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them.*

QUESTION CXIX.

OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY.

(*In Two Articles.*)

We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry : (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature? (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?

First Article.

WHETHER SOME PART OF THE FOOD IS CHANGED INTO TRUE HUMAN NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Matt. xv. 17): *Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy.* But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher (*De Gener.* i. 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the *species* from flesh belonging to *matter;* and says that the latter *comes and goes.* Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

Obj. 3. Further, the *radical humour* seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be re-

covered if the food were changed into the humour. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.

Obj. 4. Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.

Obj. 5. Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* xi.): *The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members.* But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* ii.), *The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being.* Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist

but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.

But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the *radical humour;* just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.

But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature.—Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and suchlike. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species.—Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions;—or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of

necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction, as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other thing, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxii.): *All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form.* Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.—Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called *natural forces,* would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.

Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the sub-

stance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible.—First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature.—Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. CXVIII., A. 1). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.

Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and suchlike parts. This is what the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii. 4): *Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh.*

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord does not say that the *whole* of what enters into the mouth, but *all*,—because something

from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.

Reply Obj. 2. By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that *just as in things which have their species in matter*—for instance, wood or stone—*so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter.* Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be of different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.

It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.

Reply Obj. 3. The *radical humour* is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand

or foot is amputated. But the *nutritive humour* is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

Reply Obj. 4. Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (*De Gener.* i. 5).

Reply Obj. 5. As the Philosopher says (*De Gener.* i. 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEMEN IS PRODUCED FROM SURPLUS FOOD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* i. 8) that

generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten. But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.

Obj. 2. Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.

Obj. 3. Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If, therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* x. 20) that we were in Adam *not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body.* But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (*De Gener. Animal.* i. 18) that *the semen is surplus food.*

I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above (A. 1; Q. CXVIII., A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue

in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part.—Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible.

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1; Q. CVIII., A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes

its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

Reply Obj. 4. These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the *corporeal substance,* not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For *such a birth was becoming to Him,** WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.

* Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; *Breviary O.P.*

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